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dence of global best standards? The authors use the system, societal,
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or to their national institutional contexts.
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The human resource management (HRM) practices adopted by multina-tional companies (MNCs) have long attracted interest. Early ideas
tended to assume a footloose group of firms unconstrained by local con-
texts and pursuing a global agenda of cost minimization (Fröbel et al. 1980).
Research later established the continuing influence of the institutional con-
texts of MNCs' countries of origin and of the environments of the countries
in which they operated (Ferner and Quintanilla 2002). More recent re-
search has returned to the idea of global influences, arguing that a national-
level framework gives insufficient attention to these forces and that firms
may adopt common practices as they pursue what they perceive to be a
global standard (Pudelko and Harzing 2007). Thus, our research pursues
answers to two questions: (1) Do MNCs follow similar practices regardless
of where they come from or are located, or are they more shaped by their
origins and local contexts? (2) To the extent that practices are similar, is
there any evidence of the adoption of global best standards? These ques-
tions are important for understanding the extent to which MNCs are glo-
balized or embedded in national institutional systems. The answers have
implications for how they manage themselves and how other actors engage
with them.
Researchers have used three frameworks to attempt to understand the
role of national and globallnstitutional contexts in shaping the practices of
firms: the neo-institutionalist analysis of regimes (Kostova 1999), the variet-
ies of capitalism (VoC) literature (Hall and Soskice 2001), and the "system,
societal and dominance" (SSD) approach (Smith and Meiksins 1995).
Building on critiques of the first two, we develop the third. MNCs are het-
erogeneous, and they draw in complex ways on the "distinctive and varie-
gated institutional configurations, including systems of employment
relations, in which they are embedded" (Ferner and Quintanilla 2002:
249).
Previous survey research has set out to test the SSD model. Societal ef-
fects, that is, those arising from differences between individual countries,
are the easiest to capture. We add to existing studies here with our analysis
of detailed representative data on 1,100 MNC subsidiaries in four countries:
Canada, Ireland, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Our distinctive contribu-
tion is to conceptually and empirically tease apart system and dominance
effects; doing so is difficult because they both manifest as similarity in or-
ganizational practices, but our data are the richest to date to permit the
necessary teasing out of complex influences. System effects reflect the char-
acteristics of capitalism as a system and become visible at the firm level
through the widespread adoption of common practices or standards; domi-
nance effects arise from the leading role of dominant economies and the
diffusion of practices originated in them. Clearly observed similarities could
be due to either. It is therefore necessary to interrogate data through a se-
ries of related questions: Can we identify distinct practices of firms from
dominant economies? If these practices are widespread, we can conclude
that dominance effects exist. If there are also other patterns of commonality
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reflecting some global HR model, these strengthen arguments for system
effects. Of our subsidiaries, 420 were owned by U.S. firms; we use differ-
ences between these dominant-economy firms and other firms to assess
dominance effects. To assess system effects we look simultaneously for the
widespread commonality in practices across host context and between U.S.-
owned and non-U.S. owned subsidiaries that are not explained by domi-
nance effects.
Frameworks of Analysis
The influential, indeed hegemonic, neo-institutionalist approach (Ferner et
al. 2012: 164) identifies the institutional profile of countries and measures
the distance between countries (Kostova et al. 2008). It assumes the extent
of transfer of practices by MNCs will be greater the shorter the institutional
distance. It has particular strengths, notably in disaggregating the idea of
transfer: a practice may formally operate in an MNCs subsidiary but only at
the level of lip service. The limitation of this approach is that it gives littie
attention to global forces that may overwhelm national differences. Re-
search in Eastern Europe, for example, has analyzed MNC subsidiaries in
formerly communist countries that had been institutionally very different
from leading global economies. This institutional distance did not necessar-
ily retard the adoption of global standards; subsidiaries have at times gone
out of their way to overtake their Western counterparts (Meardi and Tóth
2006). Bjorkman et al. (2007), studying subsidiaries in the United States,
Finland, and Russia, similarly argue that those in the last country, though
institutionally distant from MNCs' head offices, need "modern" practices
more than those in the other countries as they try to catch up with the de-
mands of a market economy. Institutional distance may be only one among
a number of influences on practice.
The varieties of capitalism approach began from the now-familiar con-
trast between liberal market economies (LMEs) and coordinated market
economies (CMEs). LMEs, with the United States as the exemplar, are
driven by free market principles and neoliberal policies. In CMEs, notably
Germany, social and political institutions, including labor market actors
such as unions, shape economic activity. Firms from the first will tend to use
employment systems based on individual incentives, while those from the
latter will aim to build longer term commitment (Hall and Soskice 2001).
MNCs from the relevant countries will then be expected to transfer such
practices internationally within the constraints of having to operate in a
host country of a different kind.
Such ideas have stimulated empirical research (Farndale et al. 2008;
Pudelko and Harzing 2008). But these studies have some well-established
limitations. From vñthin the VoC approach, Hancké et al. (2007) list sever-
al: a tendency to focus on the national system, thus treating firms as the
creatures of the systems in which they are based and giving insufficient
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attention to choice and variation; the treatment of types of economy as fixed
and coherent things, rather than as complex historical products containing
a blend of elements with contrasting features; and the downplaying of forces
at the global level. This recognition of multiple lines of causality begins to
acknowledge critiques from outside the tradition. Whitley (1999) identified
six kinds of national business systems as opposed to only two, while Amable
(2003), starting from a large set of empirical indicators, generated five groups.
Thelen (2004) demonstrates the complex dynamics of skills systems in four
countries and the drawbacks of reducing these to fixed types. Crouch
(2005), building on his own extensive research on the evolution of national
employment systems (Crouch 1993) as well as integrating work of this kind,
argues that any national system reflects a continual "recombination" of ele-
ments drawn eclectically from many sources and not necessarily represent-
ing any simple model.
Although these post- or non-VoC theories underpin our own starting
point, they generally focus on the level of national economies and varia-
tions between them. The SSD approach complements this idea with the
reminder that varieties of capitalism are still indeed capitalism (Smith and
Meiksins 1995; Sklair 2001). It thus identifies system effects at the level of
capitalism as a whole; these include the need for accumulation and com-
mon forces arising from such things as technological innovation. The ex-
amples of Fastern Europe and Russia given above are illustrations of how
system effects can propel hitherto backward economies toward the lead in
the pursuit of global best practices. Dominance effects arise when a national
system appears to have developed leading practices that are adopted else-
where (Mayrhofer and Brewster 2005); familiar examples are the adoption
of U.S. organizational structures in Europe (Djelic 1998) and the subse-
quent popularity of Japanese lean production techniques (Elger and Smith
2005). Societal effects 2ire outcomes of nationally specific traditions. The neo-
institutionalist and VoC approaches tend to focus on this level, for exam-
ple, differences between national contexts and their resultant effects on
the ease of transfer of practices. In addition to identifying these effects,
SSD also stresses the interaction of its three elements and historical contin-
gency.
Some readings of SSD take it as identifying forces whose effects can be
measured against each other. Are societal effects in some sense stronger
than dominance effects (e.g.. Lane 1997)? The authors of the approach
reject this interpretation, stressing instead that the three influences inter-
relate and intersect in complex ways (Smith 2008: 41). Consider for exam-
ple the "dominant" practice of lean production. Research has repeatedly
shown that its adoption has varied among countries and that the nature of a
lean regime has been subtly altered in practice (Kochan et al. 1997). There
is room to mediate between an approach that reduces SSD to concrete mea-
sures and one that insists on historical contingency at the level of the indi-
vidual firm. We develop hypotheses relating to each of the three dimensions
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of system, dominance, and society. We also measure contingency effects at
the level of the firm.
Perhaps the greatest challenge to SSD is the separation of system and
dominance effects. If we observe a common set of U.S.-style practices, is this
because other countries have followed a dominant model from the United
States or because of some systemwide logic? Existing research reflects this
challenge. One study speaks of standardization toward globalhest practices,
which it measures by the extent to which subsidiaries of non-U.S. firms adopt
U.S. practices rather than following those of their home or host country
(Pudelko and Harzing 2007, 2008). System and dominance effects are thus
identified but not distinguished in terms of discrete effects.
Parry et al. (2008) analyzed North American MNCs in various countries
of operation. They identified a set of U.S. HR practices and found that these
were generally more common in LMEs than in CMEs. This is consistent with
dominance effects, as well as with theories of institutional distance. As for
societal effects, Farndale et al. (2008) found that MNC subsidiaries in CMEs
had less leeway in their choice of HR arrangements than did those in LMEs.
This is consistent with societal effects (and also VoC) because CME institu-
tions are expected to impose more decisive constraints on firms than are
approaches that are more driven by markets. These authors, however, could
not assess firms from other countries or offer any specific explanation for
how the interplay between different effects takes place. Lawler et al. (2011)
similarly found some evidence of the use of a set of HR practices by U.S.
MNCs across countries, albeit with considerable variation among host coun-
tries; this is consistent with system and dominance effects and also with
societal-level adaptation, though these authors do not spell out the relevant
causal processes in detail.
Stressing local adaptation, Brewster et al. (2008: 334-35) "found no evi-
dence ofthe dominance of a coherent HRM paradigm reflecting the global
dissemination of 'best practices'. . . . [M]anagers seem to combine a range
of practices molded by institutionally embedded opportunities and con-
straints operating at a range of levels." On their first point, however, they
also show that, in a given country, domestic and foreign-owned MNCs have
similarlïSM practices, which might suggest that, as MNCs, they are stronger
bearers of global effects than are domestic firms; furthermore the authors
do not say what a "coherent HRM paradigm" comprises, so that it is not
clear against what standard of global practices MNCs are being judged.
Their second point is consistent with a contingency account, though they
do not specifically disentangle system, dominance, and societal effects.
These previous studies have found it hard to distinguish among system,
societal, and dominance effects. Some of them analyze only North Ameri-
can firms while others study MNCs as a group as compared to non-MNCs.
Such data make it impossible to test for dominance effects by comparing
MNCs from dominant economies with others. System effects are also hard
to unravel because it is not clear whether commonalities reflect country-of-
origin or wider systemic influences. Our data are better suited to addressing
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such issues because they embrace U.S.- and non-U.S. firms; permit compari-
son within a representative set of MNCs; offer measurement of HRM prac-
tices against a defined standard; and allow for the competing forces of SSD
to be examined and, in particular, for system effects to be deduced from
patterns in the data that do not fit dominance or societal effects.
Operationalizing SSD
As we have noted, societal effects are the simplest to measure. The most basic
expectations are that differences in the use of HRM practices exist between
countries and that they remain when other influences are controlled for.
For VoC, these differences are patterned. Hall and Gingerich (2009) de-
velop a scale of degree of coordination where the United States scores 0.00
and Germany scores 0.95. Of our four countries, Spain has an index of 0.57,
compared to Canada's 0.13, and 0.07 for the United Kingdom and 0.29 for
Ireland. Indeed, on the OECD's Employment Protection Index for 2008,
Spain scores higher than other CMEs, with a score of 3.11 against Germa-
ny's 2.63 (OECD 2008). Canada, at 1.02, is close to the United States, the
country with the weakest protection, which has an index of 0.85. The United
Kingdom and Ireland score 1.09 and 1.39, respectively. VoC thus expects
Spain to be distinct from the other three countries. When we identify sets of
HRM practices, firms from LMEs are expected to use individualized em-
ployment practices such as contingent pay. Employment protection legisla-
tion affects nonmanagerial employees more than managers, and VoC
accounts would thus expect Spain to be most distinctive in relation to non-
managerial employees.
We prefer a less deterministic reading and do not propose specific soci-
etal effects, but consider instead how they might work in light of the results
as a whole. If we consider Spain and the United Kingdom, the two coun-
tries furthest apart on the Hall-Gingerich scale, there is in fact more open-
ness in Spain to ideas from outside than might be expected; some scholars
even argue that Spain may be the more open. The United Kingdom, though
having relatively weak labor laws, also has a strongly established institu-
tional tradition. Some scholars see the United Kingdom as uniquely trapped
in a "low skills equilibrium" from which firms find it hard to escape (see
Keep et al. 2006). The implication is that innovative ideas might be hard to
implement in a context such as the United Kingdom. Spain, by contrast,
has lacked such a tradition in terms of management practices. As Ferner
et al. (2001: 124) note, "the Spanish management model is more open
than the British"; it has experienced a "confluence of styles and prac-
tices . . . transmitted to an important extent through the operations of
MNCs." Bayo-Moriones and Galdon-Sanchez (2010) similarly characterize
Spain as malleable but regulated. Therefore, one might expect any innova-
tion in Spain to be associated with practices affecting managers, while those
for nonmanagerial employees may be more constrained by legal require-
ments.
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As for system and dominance effects, we use three ways to disentangle
them. First, we identify what a global HRM paradigm comprises and then
test for its presence. This has not been done explicitly to date. If its adop-
tion is widely diffused, we can conclude that system effects may be present.
We test further to see whether some expected dominance or societal effects
do not in fact exist. This would leave system effects as the remaining possi-
ble cause of observed patterns. We would, of course, need further evidence
of relevant mechanisms to sustain this account.
Second, we can follow those who see U.S. practices as having a renewed
global dominance. This dominance reflects the weakening of alternative
models, such as the Japanese or the German, and the rise of the strongly
U.S.-influenced model of financialized capitalism (Fligstein 2001; Dore
2008) and the global position of the "Washington consensus" (Stiglitz 2002).
If specifically U.S. practices are common, dominance effects may exist.
Third, we ask where the practices are found. One reading of dominance
effects, consistent with neo-institutionalism, is that these will spread from
leading countries to those countries closest to them. A VoC explanation
would be that, if leading countries are LMEs, then similar practices will be
most likely in other LMEs; however, if these patterns are not present then
arguments for system effects are strengthened.
Specifically, system effects are indicated by the widespread adoption of a set
of global HRM practices. If, moreover, adoption is common across different
parts of the work force, this idea is strengthened. They are to a degree in-
ferred from the gaps and anomalies in other explanations. We therefore
discuss them last in the empirical analysis. If common patterns persist when
we take account of dominance and societal effects and other contingencies,
the idea of system effects remains a plausible one. Finally, if we find that
HRM practices diffuse in ways not consistent with other explanations, sys-
tem effects may be present. Thus Spain is institutionally different from our
other countries and has historically also been the most excluded from the
global economic system. Neo-institutionalism and VoC would thus predict
that Spain would be the least likely to deploy global practices. If this is not
the case, system effects remain a plausible explanation.
Dominance effects are indicated, first, by the diffusion of practices associ-
ated with a dominant economy, which we take to be the United States. It is
well established that U.S. MNCs use centralized approaches to HRM and
also grant subsidiaries little autonomy (Almond et al. 2005). We would thus
expect them to score high on those aspects of HRM practices related to the
control of the performance of employees.
Some readings of dominance effects, consistent with neo-institutionalism,
expect the effects to diffuse to countries similar to the United States. In this
case, Canada is clearly the most similar institutionally to the United States of
the countries in our study, given, for example, the Wagner Act-style of labor
law it shares with the United States; geographical proximity may also be im-
portant. By the same logic, U.S.-style HRM practices would be expected to
be least common in Spain. Our own reading of dominance effects, follow-
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ing Smith (2008), is that they should not be interpreted in such a one-
dimensional way: they interact with other measures. But we acknowledge
and test the alternative reading.
To summarize, if societal effects are very strong we expect differences
among our four countries of operation. If VoC or institutional distance fac-
tors are at work, we expect Spain to be different from the other three coun-
tries. If dominance effects are present, we expect evidence of U.S.-style
practices across all four countries and especially in the three LMEs. System
effects will be indicated by widespread take-up of a common set of practices
that correspond to some idea of best practices and also by wide diffusion of
these practices that cannot be explained by the other two sets of effects. We
need to disaggregate HRM practices in two ways: in terms of different di-
mensions, to refine the test of U.S. dominance effects; and in relation to
different groups of employees, to test whether societal constraints are stron-
gest in relation to nonmanagerial employees, for whom employment pro-
tection laws are more salient than they are for managers.
HRM Practices
The debate on HRM practices has been extensive and contentious (Becker
and Huselid 2006; Kaufman 2010). Much of the contention turns on their
effects on employees. But we are interested here in the practices as depen-
dent variables and thus this specific area of contention is less central. HRM
practices are properties of firms, not national systems. It is therefore neces-
sary to place "the firm at the centre of analysis" (Hancké et al. 2007: 5). The
practices are not a random list. According to Wright and Boswell (2002:
253), there is an emerging consensus "around conceptual categories of em-
ployee skills, motivation and empowerment." As Boselie et al. (2005) show,
the most popular way to capture this consensus is the Abilities, Motivation,
and Opportunity (AMO) framework. We can take this framework as estab-
lishing a benchmark of best or leading practices and thus establish how far
MNCs share a set of such practices. Abilities embraces the skills and compe-
tencies that workers possess. Motivation addresses the factors that give work-
ers incentives to deploy their abilities. Opportunity covers means through
which the resulting commitment can be put into practice.
There are some unresolved issues about which concrete practices to in-
clude under each heading. Some scholars place practices such as appraisal
widiin Abilities (Boxall and Purcell 2003: 144). Yet appraisal is at least as
much about systems of control as it is about abilities. The AMO framework
indeed rather underplays the fact that HRM is not just about releasing work-
ers' abilities and motivating them. Any HR system needs discipline and con-
trol, as generations of labor process scholars have pointed out (Edwards
1979): Managers need to regulate workers so that they work in ways consis-
tent with organizational goals. The specific control elements of high-perfor-
mance systems, such as the demands that they can put on workers, are also
well established (Thompson and Harley 2007).
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We have relatively few measures that might be classified as Abilities and
thus say little about this dimension. Therefore we will refer to the Motivation,
Opportunities, and Control dimensions of HR practices. We follow the estab-
lished practice in studies using the AMO framework of treating each dimen-
sion as independent, rather than aggregating them as a single measure.
Data, Methods, and Measurement
The key independent variables are the countries of operation and origin of
the MNCs. The former are simply the four countries where the subsidiaries
were located: Canada, Ireland, Spain, and the United Kingdom. As to the
country of origin of the companies owning the subsidiaries under study, the
United States has by far the greatest number, 'with the United Kingdom,
France, Germany, Japan, and the Nordic countries also having significant
representation. For some studies in this special issue, comparison between
these indi'vidual countries-of-origin is important. We are interested here in
the LME-CME contrast and also in any specifically U.S.-based dominance
effects. The sample was therefore grouped by country of origin as follows:
U.S.-owned MNCs (420 in number) were thus compared to MNCs from the
three most heavily represented countries of origin generally considered to
be liberal market economies, namely, the United Kingdom, Canada, and
Ireland (n = 223) and to the remaining 457 subsidiaries owned by multina-
tionals from broadly CME economies. An alternative approach is to classify
countries-of- origin on the Hall-Gingerich (2009) scale; similar results were
obtained.
Identification and Measurement of HRM Practices
In addition to country of origin, we also need to control for other possible
influences. Some studies look at a wide-ranging group of employment prac-
tices, including trends in numbers employed and use of nonstandard labor
(Brewster et al. 2008; Parry et al. 2008). This lacks precision if the goal is to
identify a specific global model of practices that are chosen by MNCs, as op-
posed to measuring all the dimensions on which they may differ from do-
mestic firms. Lawler et al. (2011) use extensive sets of indicators in relation
to four areas: training and development; staffing (for example, approaches
to selection); compensation; and workplace empowerment. Bjorkman et al.
(2007) use a similar list, though with the addition of communication.
Pudelko and Harzing (2007) list seven areas, though two of these arguably
do not measure HR practices specifically; the other five embrace recruit-
ment, training, assessment, incentives, and communication. Walsworth and
Verma (2007) have a similar list of high-performance practices. We cover
compensation, empowerment, training and development, communication,
and assessment.
Some studies, ask respondents to consider pairs of opposing statements
about the use of practices (Pudelko and Harzing 2007) or to report the
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Table 1. HRM Practices
Practice LOC Managers
Motivation
Policy to pay > median pay in the country — Y
Use of share-ownership schemes — Y
Use of profit sharing — Y
Use of share options — Y
Communication: use of briefing groups Y —
Communication: 2-way Y —
Communication: newsletters, etc. , Y —
Information provision: financial plans Y —
Information provision: staffing plans Y —
Information provision: investment plans Y —
Opportunity
Use of short-term international assignments — Y
Use of long-term international assignments — Y
Use of global management training — Y
Use of team working Y —
Use of problem-solving groups Y —
Control
Use of performance appraisal Y Y
Use of variable pay Y Y
Use of forced distribution or ranking in appraisal Y Y
Assessment against set of global competencies — Y
extent to which a practice is used (Lawler et al. 2011). The difficulty here is
that perceptions are necessarily involved. We would want respondents to use
other MNCs as their benchmark, but they might well not know about other
firms or use some other benchmark, such as firms in general. We preferred
to ask about the presence of concrete practices. Respondents were also not
asked to estimate the proportion of employees covered by certain practices.
We had one set of perceptual questions, but these related to the company
itself and not to implicit comparator companies.
Ferner and Almond (2013) draw directly on dominance theories to iden-
tify a characteristically U.S. "pay and performance management system"
that embraces appraisal systems, contingent pay, and share ownership and
profit-related pay (seejacoby 1997). We draw on the'se ideas in particular as
we look at dominance effects: U.S. firms are most likely to deploy practices
falling within the control dimension of practices.
We asked separately about two groups of employees: managers and the
largest occupational group (LOG). Managers were defined as those in man-
agerial positions above the level of first-line supervision and the LOG as a
specifically nonmanagerial group; and we offered illustrations if necessary.
Our strategy here is to ground practices in relation to concrete, named
groups and also to reflect the fact that different groups of employees may be
managed differently.
Though we do not follow a strictly high-performance model, we are inter-
ested in practices that reflect some kind of best practices model and that
specifically illustrate the motivation, opportunity, and control aspects of an
HRM system. Table 1 shows the full list in relation to managers and the
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LOG. Some of the relevant concepts are best measured at the level of the
individual workplace, for example the extent and nature of training Qones
et al. 2010). We thus had few measures of abilities.
We coded all variables as dummy variables, with 1 indicating the presence
of the practice. In many cases, the underlying concept, for example, whether
or not share-owning schemes were in place, is binary. In relation to the four
questions about global assignments, training, and competencies, however, the
survey question asked about the extent of use on a five-point scale. For consis-
tency with the other measures, we reduced these indicators to binary mea-
sures taking the two categories of greatest use to indicate clear presence of a
practice. We had a total of 22 practices or 19 if we count those in common
across the two groups only once. Some of these are summaries of even more
detailed indicators. For example, in relation to communication with the LOG
we asked about 8 forms, plus "other"; the three listed combine the key ones.
The number of practices adopted in this analysis compares well with
other studies, for example Pudelko and Harzing's 20 (2007, 2008) and
Brewster et al.'s 15 (2008). As to those selected, we are perhaps lightest on
training and development. Despite these limitations, we have a range of
practices indexing relevant concepts.
The Strategic Context of the MNC
Because HRM practices are properties of firms, we need to take account of
firms' organizational structures. For our purposes, these factors are mainly
control variables: Do SSD effects remain even after we have controlled for
the structure of the firm? But the SSD framework also stresses the choices
made by firms, and we consider whether indicators of choice affect the take-
up of practices. We address the integration of the MNC and its HR structures.
There is a clear line of theory saying that HRM practices will be most de-
veloped in integrated firms, because such practices promote the sharing of
resources across subsidiaries. Less integrated firms benefit less from the use
of these practices. An alternative view would say that the use of practices is
driven by broader competitive or isomorphic pressures and that the struc-
ture of firms will have little effect. We are agnostic as between these two posi-
tions. We measured the relevant variables as follows:
Interdependencies were measured by two dummy variables. One indicated
whether the national subsidiary supplied to other parts of the worldwide company
or not. The second identified whether the national subsidiary was supplied by
other parts of the worldwide operations. These were combined into one measure
with four categories: supplying to and from; supplying only to; supplied only by;
and neither.
Standardization indicates whether the firm's product or service was adapted to
local markets or standardized at a regional or global level.
Organization structure was measured by three binary variables indicating
whether the firm used product divisions, whether it had regional divisions, and
whether it had both of these structures.
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The size of the company was measured in terms of the size of the worldwide
company and ofthe subsidiary, each assessed in terms of numbers of employees
and categorized to reflect the fact that several respondents could estimate size
only in ranges.
A firm's HR system is important in its use of practices such as organiza-
tional learning (McDonnell et al. 2010; Tregaskis et al. 2010). We include
two indicators ofthe extent of global HR structures and policies. We expect
positive effects on the use of HRM practices if choice is important.
International HR committee measured whether the MNG had a formal commit-
tee of senior managers responsible for developing HR policies across countries.
This was dummy coded with 1 indicating presence of such a committee. We also
had other measures such as whether the worldwide company used a human re-
source information system. We examined these, but their results were similar to
those for the most straightforward measure ofthe presence of a committee.
HR philosophy measured whether the MNC had a worldwide philosophy on the
management of its workforce that governed all global operations. This was mea-
sured on a 5-point scale of agreement as to how far a philosophy existed.
Finally, we included three other control variables. The sector of operation of
a firm was dichotomized as production and service firms. In so far as prac-
tices such as teamwork and associated ideas such as lean production were
strongly associated with manufacturing, we would expect take-up to be
greater in the production sector. Trade union recognition measured whether
the subsidiary recognized trade unions. There has been considerable de-
bate on whether unions promote or retard use of HRM practices. It may
also be that the effects are greater in relation to the LOG than to managers.
Workforce skill level measured whether the largest occupations group of the
subsidiary was one of technical/professional, sales staff, clerical/administrative
staff, or manual operatives.
Mode of Analysis and Data Description
We analyzed the data in two ways. First, we classified each of the individual
measures listed in Table 1 in terms of country of operation and the contrast
by country of origin between U.S.-owned firms, firms from other LMEs, and
all other (CME) firms. The results from this descriptive analysis (available
on request) suggested some patterns that were interrogated further. All the
descriptive statistics are based on weighted data for each country.
Second, we aggregated the measures under each of the concepts of moti-
vation, opportunity, and control to create six summary indices (that is, three
for managers and three for the LOG). These indices count the number of
practices under each heading. The results were consistent with the exami-
nation of the individual measures. How did we account for missing data?
One strategy is to count any affirmation that a practice exists as a yes, treat-
ing all no and don't know replies as the default category. This may, however,
force undue clarity on respondents. We preferred the more conservative
approach of treating don't know replies as missing, and eliminating cases
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Table 2. Dependent Variables: Mean Values by Country of Origin
and Country of Operations
Variable
Overall mean
Range
n
Country of origin
United States
LME (others)
CME
Significant differences between
groups at 5% level (Rvalue)
Effect size (TJ^)
Country of operations
United Kingdom
Canada
Ireland
Spain
Significant, differences between
groups at 5% level (/rvalue)
Effect size (TI^)
LMorrv
4.8
0-6
1,057
4.9
4.7
4.7
No
(0.182)
0.003
4.7
5.1
4.7
4.7
Yes
(0.000)
0.018
LOG
WPP
1.4
0-2
1,084
1.4
1.3
1.4
No
(0.178)
0.003
1.5
1.2
1.3
1.4
Yes
(0.000)
0.029
LCONTROL
2.0
0-3
820
2.0
1.8
1.9
Yes
(0.002)
0.015
1.9
1.7
2.0
2.1
Yes
(0.000)
0.036
MMOTIV
1.6
0-4
839
1.9
1.9
1.3
Yes
(0.000)
0.057
1.6
(a)
1.6
1.7
No
(0.510)
0.002
MANAGEBS
MOPP
2.1
0-3
807
2.1
1.9
2.2
Yes
(0.021)
0.009
2.3
1.5
2.1
2.4
Yes
(0.000)
0.111
MGONTROL
3.0
0-4
743
3.2
2.8
3.0
Yes
(0.000)
0.046
2.9
2.8
3.1
3.3
Yes
(0.000)
0.064
Notes: rf is the eta-squared statistic derived from ANOVA, analogous to R^in regression equations.
Definitions:
LMOTIV: 3 items of information provision plus 3 items of communication
LOPP: Use of teamwork and/or problem-solving groups
LCONTROL: Use of performance appraisal, forced distribution in appraisal, use of variable pay
MMOTIV: Use of pay > median, use of profit share, share options, share ownership
MOPP: Use of short- or long-term international assignments, use of global management training
MCONTROL: Use of performance appraisal, forced distribution in appraisal, use of variable pay, assess-
ment against global competencies.
" Not available for Canada.
with any such replies from the indices. The result is that we have variable
sample sizes across the six indicators. We deployed bivariate analyses and
multivariate modeling to the indices. For the latter, we also tested our mod-
els on a consistent set of observations (n = 640) across all six indices; the
results were consistent with the wider data set on which we report. We prefer
this data set because it uses the maximum information from the sample as
well as having larger numbers and thus more accurate estimates of confi-
dence intervals.
The first panel of Table 2 reports the mean of each measure, the observed
range, and the number of observations. The second panel shows a break-
down against the MNC's country of origin and the results of significance
testing for differences across the three categories and the effect sizes. For
example, on the measure of motivation for the LOG there was no difference
between U.S.-owned subsidiaries, those from other LMEs, or those from
CMEs. The third panel does the same across the four countries of operation.
One preliminary result concerns the relationships among the aspects of
motivation, opportunity, and control. The indices were positively but not
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Strongly related to each other, and this suggests that they indeed capture
different dimensions. This positive association does not support the view
that one form of HRM is a substitute for another but rather is consistent
with argtoments that HRM systems tend to comprise complementary ele-
ments and that firms do not, for example, rely on motivation as an alterna-
tive to control (Ferner 2000).
Examination of the distribution of the measures (not shown) revealed a
spread across the range rather than concentration at the potentially high-
performance end of the range. This is consistent with Brewster et al.'s argu-
ment(2008) that there is no coherent HRM paradigm among MNCs in the
sense of a complete package that is widely adopted, as well as with national-
level studies showing a bell-shaped distribution of HRM practices (Bryson et
al. 2007; Kaufman 2010). Yet to expect such a package would be to impose a
very strong test. We show that there was evidence of adoption of the HRM
paradigm, albeit in less than complete ways.
Multivariate modeling used the six measures from Table 2 as the depen-
dent variables; that is, we count the number of practices under each mea-
sure. Because of the count nature of these variables, we used Poisson models
to overcome the limitations of linear modeling. ^  Since the Poisson model is
nonlinear, the estimated average partial effects of the explanatory variables
are not directly given by the estimated coefficients. They are instead a non-
linear function of these coefficients and the explanatory variables. The Pois-
son estimates and estimated partial effects are presented in Table 3.^
The results in Table 3 show, first, that there is a binary variable for whether
or not the subsidiary is owned by an MNC based in the relevant country or
by a foreign MNC. We treat this largely as an additional control variable.
Second comes the country of operation. Third, we distinguish further by
identifying those firms that are, for example, owned and based in the United
Kingdom as compared to those owned and based in one of the other three
countries. The purpose of this is to assess whether such locally oriented sub-
sidiaries are in some way different from more globally influenced ones.
Fourth, we have the country of origin of the MNC (United States, other
LME, and CME). Then come controls for the structure of the firm and its
size. The two measures reflecting HR choice (an international HR commit-
tee and the presence of a philosophy) come next. Finally, there are controls
for the sector of operation, union recognition, and measures of the skill
structure of the work force. The Appendix gives the correlation matrix for
all these variables; the low levels of correlation among them suggest that
multicollinearity was not a problem.
'The Poisson model imposes some restrictions, mainly that the conditional mean and conditional vari-
ance coincide. In many applications this assumption is very restrictive, since it is quite common to find
evidence of overdispersion (conditional variance higher than that under the Poisson assumption). How-
ever, we have not found evidence of this problem in our data, i.e., the Poisson assumptions were not
unduly restrictive. Eurther, to control for potential misspecifications in the variance, we have performed
the estimation with robust standard errors.
Poisson estimated coefficients are available from the authors upon request.
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Table 3. Estimated Average Partial Effects from Poisson Estimates
Variable
Ownership Reference: Foreign
Domestic
Country of operations
Reference: United Kingdom
Canada
Ireland
Spain
Domestic MNC by country
Reference: Domestic in United
Kingdom
Domestic in Canada
Domestic in Ireland
Domestic in Spain
Country of origin Reference:
LME (others)
United States
CME
Inter-dependencies
Subsidiary supplies other
parts of the MNC
Survey country operations
supplied by other parts
Standardization Reference:
Globally standardized products
Products adapted locally
Organization structure
Product divisions
Regions
Both
Subsidiary size Reference:
<500 employees
500-999 employees
1,000 or more employees
Worldwide size Reference:
< 1,000 employees
1,000-4,999 employees
LMorrv
0.209
(0.258)
0.170
(0.136)
0.035
(0.119)
-0.092
(0.117)
0.140
(0.288)
-0.676**
(0.302)
-0.302
(0.292)
0.146
(0.156)
0.092
(0.159)
0.095
(0.084)
0.030
(0.089)
0.038
(0.086)
-0.151
(0.152)
-0.096
(0.130)
-0.154
(0.121)
-0.086
(0.108)
-0.095
(0.096)
0.405*
(0.215)
LOG
LOPP
0.386***
(0.134)
-0.256***
(0.075)
-0.123*
(0.070)
0.034
(0.071)
-0.353**
(0.162)
-0.408***
(0.135)
-0.396***
(0.117)
0.076
(0.093)
0.040
(0.092)
0.212***
(0.056)
0.015
(0.059)
-0.013
(0.054)
0.279***
(0.117)
0.169*
(0.099)
0.173**
(0.085)
-0.096
(0.066)
-0.029
(0.059)
-0.005
(0.113)
LCONTROL
0.079
(0.152)
-0.239**
(0.102)
0.021
(0.077)
0.163**
(0.079)
0.106
(0.294)
-0.153
(0.190)
-0.090
(0.182)
0.115
(0.105)
0.042
(0.106)
0.102*
(0.059)
0.054
(0.061)
-0.113*
(0.060)
0.020
(0.117)
0.114
(0.102)
0.065
(0.095)
-0.029
(0.068)
-0.181***
(0.065)
0.013
(0.134)
MMOTIV
0.386*
(0.223)
—
0.090
(0.125)
0.284**
(0.126)
—
-0.338
(0.229)
-0.393*
(0.213)
-0.029
(0.118)
-0.511***
(0.127)
0.199**
(0.092)
0.005
(0.100)
0.061
(0.093)
0.149
(0.204)
0.176
(0.172)
0.287*
(0.157)
0.246**
(0.124)
0.269**
(0.108)
-0.139
(0.215)
MANAGERS
MOPP MCONTROL
0.667**
(0.277)
-0.718***
(0.126)
-0.098
(0.105)
-0.096
(0.107)
0.056
(0.343)
-0.040
(0.258)
-0.282
(0.241)
0.551***
(0.179)
0.571***
(0.186)
0.045
(0.085)
0.016
(0.094)
-0.109
(0.086)
0.967***
(0.254)
0.708***
(0.205)
0.702***
(0.167)
0.103
(0.118)
0.235**
(0.092)
-0.237
(0.218)
-0.271*
(0.163)
-0.027
(0.098)
0.115
(0.090)
0.283***
(0.084)
0.123
(0.227)
0.237
(0.203)
0.477**
(0.225)
0.138
(0.106)
-0.050
(0.108)
0.169***
(0.061)
0.047
(0.061)
-0.059
(0.060)
0.255**
(0.116)
0.057
(0.098)
-0.001
(0.092)
-0.070
(0.076)
-0.085
(0.059)
-0.002
(0.164)
continued
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Table 3. Continued
Variable
5,000-29,999 employees
30,000-59,999 employees
60,000 or more employees
International HR committee
Existence of a global
philosophy? Reference:
disagree strongly
Disagree
Neither
Agree
Strongly agree
Sector of operations
Reference: Manufacturing
Service sector
Union recognition
Workforce skill level
Reference: Clerical/
administrative
Technical/Professional
Sales staff
Manual operatives
Number of observations
Goodness-of-fit''
LMOTIV
0.430**
(0.216)
0.544**
(0.247)
0.693***
(0.243)
0.397***
(0.085)
-0.069
(0.177)
-0.014
(0.173)
-0.032
(0.164)
0.059
(0.166)
-0.235**
(0.098)
0.125
(0.087)
0.152
(0.138)
0.093
(0.142)
0.109
(0.133)
901
0.099
we
WPP
-0.041
(0.111)
-0.042
(0.126)
0.102
(0.131)
0.126**
(0.052)
-0.062
(0.109)
0.085
(0.111)
0.046
(0.102)
0.098
(0.103)
-0.073
(0.057)
-0.023
(0.057)
0.125
(0.082)
0.049
(0.089)
0.057
(0.082)
923
0.109
LCONTROL
0.052
(0.135)
0.154
(0.158)
0.218
(0.154)
0.040
(0.055)
0.126
(0.131)
0.142
(0.125)
0.194*
(0.114)
0.074
(0.117)
0.080
(0.063)
-0.183***
(0.059)
0.099
(0.086)
0.154*
(0.092)
-0.069
(0.094)
691
0.145
MMOTIV
0.022
(0.228)
0.363
(0.288)
0.128
(0.260)
0.197**
(0.088)
-0.065
(0.173)
0.076
(0.179)
-0.018
(0.161)
0.093
(0.168)
0.059
(0.093)
-0.134
(0.095)
0.135
(0.129)
0.059
(0.142)
-0.096
(0.137)
735
0.159
MANACERS
MOPP
-0.256
(0.224)
0.122
(0.252)
0.175
(0.251)
0.295***
(0.085)
-0.132
(0.187)
0.090
(0.198)
0.278
(0.180)
0.148
(0.176)
0.002
(0.089)
0.017
(0.088)
0.293**
(0.133)
0.047
(0.131)
0.172
(0.130)
688
0.243
MCONTROL
0.106
(0.164)
0.286
(0.183)
0.289
(0.179)
0.151*
(0.058)
0.098
(0.138)
0.105
(0.142)
0.117
(0.124)
0.174
(0.126)
-0.010
(0.061)
-0.047
(0.061)
-0.043
(0.090)
0.024
(0.092)
-0.046
(0.089)
640
0.176
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
"Not available for Canada
''Square of the correlation coefficient between the actual and fitted values of the dependent variable. It
is interpreted in the same way as R^ in a linear model.
*Statistically significant at the .10 level; ** at the .05 level; *** at the .01 level (two-tailed tests).
Tests of SSD
Because system effects are to some extent measured as residuals after other
effects have been taken into account, we begin at the most concrete level of
societal effects before turning to dominance and system effects. We then
consider whether SSD influences persist when organization-level variables
are included.
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Societal Effects
The simplest view of societal effects is that differences exist by country of
operation. Such differences are evident .in Table 2: On five of the six sets
of measures, there were significant differences among the four countries of
operation. The effect sizes were greater than those in respect of the country
of origin.
Yet the patterning of the differences is not consistent with societal effects
of the kind expected in a neo-institutionalist or VoC approach. Using these
approaches, we would expect Spain to be low on the use of HRM practices
because the country is most distant from the sources of the practices. Low
take-up should also be particularly marked in relation to the LOG, and we
might expect measures of control to be rare because the relevant practices
are the hardest to implement in a CME with high levels of employment pro-
tection. In fact, the country stands out for high use of practices of a control
kind. In particular, the assessment of managers against global competency
measures was used in 91% of subsidiaries in Spain, compared to between
62% and 79% in Canada and Ireland, respectively; the use of variable pay
was also relatively high. The country was not markedly different from the
other three countries in terms of motivation or opportunity.
Our three LMEs also displayed differences from each other. It is true that,
as Table 3 shows, MNCs in Ireland were not different from those in the
United Kingdom on any of the measures, except for a small but significant
difference in opportunity measures for the LOG, which were used more in
the United Kingdom. Yet in Table 2 Ganada stands out as having low use of
opportunity measures, for both managers and the LOG and low use of con-
trol in relation to the LOG. The multivariate analysis reported in Table 3
confirms that these patterns were significantly different from those in the
reference host country, the United Kingdom. When we looked at individual
practices, we found that the use of variable pay was less common for both
the LOG and managers in Canada than among|he other countries. In rela-
tion to the LOG, for example, it was reported iii 60% of subsidiaries in Can-
ada, compared to 70% in Spain, 68% in the United Kingdom, and 67% in
Ireland.
There is a specific explanation for the Canadian case. A natural aspect of
the employment system to examine is the role of unions, because Canada
has a North American system of detailed and legally enforceable collective
bargaining. We found that the presence of a union had effects in Canada
but not elsewhere. For example, variable pay and performance appraisal
were much less common in Canada where a union was present: 52% of cases
used performance appraisal, as against 92% of the nonunion firms. These
effects were weaker in the other countries. That is, unions in Canada may
have been able to limit the use of control and opportunity measures; it is
also possible that motivation is used here as an alternative, though our data
do not permit a close test of this. This result is one illustration of the consis-
tency of our results with known specific features of national systems, in this
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case the distinctive role of unions, which do not always map onto LME-CME
or institutional distance models.
Dominance Effects
To address dominance effects, we turn from the host country of a subsidiary
to the country of origin of the MNC of which it is part. A strong expectation
would be that there is a complete set of HRM practices that are most used by
firms from the dominant economy, the United States. This expectation was
not met: as Table 2 shows, on two of the six measures there were no differ-
ences of this kind, and on one, opportunity for managers, firms from CME
countries in fact scored the highest. A more precise expectation is extensive
use of control in U.S. firms. As Table 2 shows, there was evidence of this.
When we looked at the individual components of the index, we found that
it was the use of forced distributions in appraisal schemes that marked U.S.
firms. More than a third of these firms (37%) used this practice in relation
to the LOG, as against 20% of non-U.S. firms. Other aspects of contingent
reward were widespread and not peculiar to U.S. firms. Variable pay, for ex-
ample, was used in about two-thirds of firms in relation to the LOG, and in
90% for managers, regardless of country of origin. Also, as Table 2 shows,
the size of the differences between MNCs from the United States and from
other countries was not large. Moreover, firms from CME countries scored
higher on several measures, with the lowest scores in the middle range of
coordination (i.e., "LME others").
In relation to the multivariate models (Table 3), if dominance effects
were overwhelming, the measure of origin in the United States would have
strongly significant coefficients in all models, in particular those for control.
This was not the case. The coefficient for U.S. origin was significant only in
respect of the measure of opportunity for managers, and the effect for CME
origin on this measure was identical in size. In other words, it is firms from
the United States and from CME countries that differ from firms from other
LMEs on this specific measure. But other effects were^  absent.
With respect to motivation, MNCs from CMEs used fewer practices than
those from the reference category (LME other than United States) .^  We did
not find significant differences in motivation practices between United
States and other LME origins. Regarding the opportunity dimension, our
results confirm the descriptive analysis by showing that both U.S. MNCs and
those from CMEs used significantly more practices (around 0.5 more, on
average) than MNCs from LMEs other than the United States.
'The interpretation of the marginal effects in Table 3 is as follows: Consider the estimated effect for
CME in the motivation dimension for managers (-0.511). This figure implies that, other things being
equal, the average number of practices used by MNCs from CMEs is 0.5 points lower than the average
number of practices used by the reference category (MNCS from LMEs other than United States). Al-
though it could seem a very low difference, we should take into account that the range of the dependent
variable is 0-4. The effect is significant. The interpretation for the other estimated effects is analogous.
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System Effects
System effects are indicated by widespread use of HRM practices. The raw
scores of the six indices in Table 2 are all above the midpoint of the relevant
scale, suggesting extensive take-up. Scores for managers and the LOG were
also similar, a result confirmed when we looked at the individual practices
on which we had specific measures for both groups. This latter result runs
against the idea that practices among the LOG are particularly constrained
by societal factors, and is consistent with the idea of a wide distribution of
practices, as system effects arguments would predict.
System effects are also suggested when associations linked to dominance
and societal effects are weak. It is true that nine of the twelve sets of associa-
tions are statistically significant, but the effect sizes (shown by the r\^ statistic
in Table 2) are not large. To take one example from the individual measures
in Table 1, the use of two-way communication for the LOG varied between
86% for the U.S. group and 80% for the CME group.
Results that are anomalous with respect to alternative explanations also
indicate system effects. The clearest example of this in Table 2 is that, on
five of the six measures, subsidiaries in Spain used more HRM practices
than those in the other three countries. Some readings of both dominance
and societal effects, notably those based in neo-institutional and VoC theo-
rizing, expect the reverse.
In multivariate models, system effects can be seen only indirectly, as re-
siduals after other influences have been taken into account. The rather
small proportions of variance explained by the many variables in the models
suggest that such effects may exist. This is clearly only indicative evidence,
but it adds to the picture.
Organizational Structures and Choice
As for organizational contingencies, namely, interdependencies, standard-
ization, organization structure and size, these features were associated with
the use of HRM practices broadly as expected, though the effects were
rather less consistent than a strong contingency explanation would suggest.
Thus, more-integrated MNCs, specifically those subsidiaries supplying other
parts of the MNC, used on average more HRM practices, especially for the
opportunity measures for the LOG, and motivation and control measures
for managers. There was no association, however, with the extent to which
products were standardized. In terms of organizational structure, the results
do not generally support an argument suggesting that MNGs with more
elaborate structures use more HRM practices. A more complex structure
seems to play an important role on opportunity measures. These results are
consistent with a weaker contingency argument, which says that these ef-
fects are present but that wider system and dominance effects may tend to
reduce their impact.
The use of HRM practices was also connected to firms' policy choices.
There was a consistent tendency for the presence of an international HR
committee to be associated with the use of more practices. The effect was
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significant in five of the six models in Table 3, the exception being control
measures for the LOG. In general, however, we did not find significant ef-
fects of the presence of a global philosophy on HR matters.
Sector had only a limited impact. Motivation measures for the LOG were
most common in manufacturing, but there were no other differences. This
would be consistent with the idea of the global diffusion of practices across
sectors.
The effects of union recognition in the country of operation might also be
expected to have a constraining influence on the use of practices with re-
spect to the LOG but not managers. This is consistent with our results. The
one clear union effect we find is to lower the use of control measures for the
LOG, which is consistent with what one might expect given unions' general
antipathy toward individualized systems of performance management.
The composition of the workforce in terms of skills did not in general
demonstrate significant effects. There were a couple of exceptions: Control
measures for the LOG were more spread for sales staff; and opportunity mea-
sures for managers were used more for technical and professional employees.
Overall, our results show that the integration of the firm, the organiza-
tional structure and the presence of an international HR committee, as well
as size, play an important role on the use of HRM practices. These effects do
not, however, wash out those linked to system, societal and dominance influ-
ences. The SSD model, moreover, stresses that MNCs are active agents in
the configuring of HR systems. Our results are consistent with that idea.
Discussion
The SSD expectation is that there will be a defined set of best HRM practices
that are widely diffused and whose use is not constrained by societal effects or
firm-specific factors. We found evidence of diffusion and also of rather weak
constraints. It should also be noted that we lacked measures of abilities. This
is a limitation of our study but a necessary one, given that measures of them
are most appropriate at workplace level. It also has one implication, drawn to
our attention by a reviewer: It may well be that in the area of abilities MNCs
tend to follow global best practices, for example in relation to the develop-
ment of skills. If this is so, system effects will be evident here; the fact that we
have identified these effects in other areas provides a conservative test.
This did not mean, however, that there was extensive take-up of the whole set
of HRM practices. This fact suggests that anything like a "transnational solu-
tion" (Bartlett and Ghoshal 1989), in die sense of a single set of best practices
toward which MNCs are converging, remains rare. The results here thus sup-
port scholars such as Brewster et al. (2008), tiiough we take a less stark view of
what these results mean: All the international evidence points to limited take-up
of HRM practices (Kaufinan 2010), and it would be remarkable if MNCs had
really adopted a specific model in large numbers. There may be no single set of
best practices, but there is also widespread adoption of some specific practices.
We have built on the work of Pudelko and Harzing (2008) by offering
some ways to distinguish system and dominance effects. The latter are
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indicated by distinctively U.S. practices, which we have found in relation to
the control dimension of HRM practices, and this confirms other work in
this vein (Ferner and Almond 2013). We have not, however, found clear evi-
dence of diffusion to countries closest to the dominant one. In particular,
MNCs in Canada had a distinctly non-U.S. pattern of practices.
Such results support the idea that societal effects continue to operate.
But these effects are less clear than some scholars would expect. Our three
LMEs had as many differences as similarities. Moreover, Spain, usually
counted as a CME, had more HRM practices in some areas than did the
three LMEs. This result is consistent with the results of Bjorkman et al.
(2007) : MNC subsidiaries may respond to the institutional environment of a
country by deploying relatively large numbers of new practices. In the case
of Spain, as we noted, there is evidence of the malleability of the institu-
tional context, despite the country's possession of some CME features. It
may also be that MNCs in Spain use HRM practices extensively as a way of
escaping the constraints of employment protection legislation. Our results
support this view in two respects: They fit the idea of the malleability of the
Spanish system (Ferner et al. 2001), and they are also consistent with the
wider idea of "beneficial constraints" (Streeck 1997). This is the notion that
it is not necessarily the case that firms will find best solutions if left unregu-
lated and that placing constraints on how they operate may force them to
think about how they behave: Limiting the freedom to hire and fire, for ex-
ample, may lead to more careful systems to recruit workers and to use their
skills. It may be that Spanish firms have thought imaginatively about HRM
practices because they cannot readily hire and fire. It is also noticeable,
however, that they have been able to introduce practices of control: They
have not been constrained in the very fact of using practices like variable
pay, nor have they had to use other sorts of practices as an alternative.
As for the Canadian pattern, we have pointed out the role of trade unions
as one key part of the institutional context. There is also some evidence that
MNCs understand the differences between the U.S. and Canadian contexts
and that they tailor their HR approaches accordingly (Bélanger and Trudeau
2007). Such evidence warrants further investigation. We have also found
some evidence of the adoption of HRM practices being the greatest in
MNCs from well-defined business systems, those that are either clearly LMEs
or CMEs. It may be that it is consistency of context, and not its nature, that
encourages firms to adopt the practices.
We have also found evidence suggesting that MNCs' own characteristics
are important. Some structural features of firms affected the use of prac-
tices, and there were strong associations between the HR architecture and
the deployment of the practices. Some of the features of global integration,
however, were less important. More global integration did not necessarily
mean greater use of the practices. The relationship between corporate
structures and how human resources are managed is contingent on both
societal and dominance effects, an area often under-theorized in MNC re-
search. Teasing out the contingencies warrants further analysis.
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If we put these ideas together, we have to accept that, while organiza-
tional contingencies and societal factors are reasonably clear-cut, system
and dominance effects are necessarily hard to disentangle. This is the cen-
tral limitation of our study. A common pattern, which looks like a system
effect, could be the result of the widespread adoption of practices from a
dominant model. We do not see this as a problem for the SSD framework
because it stresses the interplay of different forces. A set of practices such as
lean production, for example, may have begun as a dominant idea and then
become more systemic in nature, and understanding its nature and effects
is assisted by considering the relevant linkages, as opposed to treating it ei-
ther as a specifically Japanese practice or simply as some context-free ap-
proach that will have the same meaning and effects anywhere (Elger and
Smith 2005). In the context of our study, MNCs draw their HRM practices
from many places, and they assemble them in distinct configurations. Our
goal has been to show that they do indeed engage in such assembly and that
they are influenced in their actions by their own organizational contingen-
cies, their embeddedness in countries of operation and of origin, and global
models. We have thus been able to go beyond LME-CME stereotypes, ideas
of institutional distance, and models of simple global best practice.
Conclusions
One reason for the popularity ofthe original version of VoC may be the clar-
ity of its models. We have now seen, however, that more subtle views still
render predictions that can be addressed quantitatively. Future quantitative
work can test these predictions more exactly. The research team is extend-
ing the surveys to other countries, which will allow different relationships
between system, dominance, and societal effects to be addressed. In doing
so, the role of choice, in particular the influence of the HR architecture,
merits attention. Our results also have implications for workplace-level stud-
ies. We had no measures of abilities, but workplace studies can measure
them and could study their use by MNCs as compared to other types of firm.
Case study research is also now in a position to make carefully designed
studies to build on the quantitative results, for example by identifying differ-
ent kinds of MNCs and examining the extent to which they consciously
adopt global models, together with the processes that they use to identify
and disseminate these models. The SSD framework is a flexible and power-
ful one, but it needs further empirical development. For example, saying
that a practice is global means more than that it is very common: The state-
ment also suggests that the practice fits in some sense capitahsm as a system
and that there are processes that diffuse it globally. Research might explore
the nature of this fit and processes of diffusion. Just how do MNC managers
identify practices that they wish to pursue? We have identified the impor-
tance of structures such as international HR policy committees. Case study
research might look at what such committees do. This kind of research will
be the stronger the more that it compares types of MNCs (for example.
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those that practice integration in specific ways), teases out the influence of
global forces, and follows through the effects in different societal contexts.
A related research direction derives from an experimental feature of the
survey. In the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Spain, we asked firms whether
they had a "key group" of employees who were central to the firm's success;
we were thinking, for example, of research scientists in a pharmaceuticals
company. In the United Kingdom, for example, 80% of respondents identi-
fied such a group. Given that firms have them, these groups might be the
focus for case studies around such questions as how far they are seen as a
global resource for the firm and how far employment practices for this spe-
cial group reflect distinct global requirements.
As for MNCs and actors who engage with them, the results caution against
two sets of simple lessons but also sustain an equally simple but profound
idea. The first simple lesson would be that of a universal global best prac-
tice. We have seen that firms, in fact, vary considerably in their HRM prac-
tices. The second lesson would be the fit to various societal and organizational
contexts. We have seen that these contexts are important but far from deter-
mining. The simple idea follows the configurational approach to HRM,
which is increasingly presented as a development from the best practices or
the best fit view (Paauwe and Boselie 2007). This states that firms configure
their practices in ways shaped but not determined by their contexts. They
have considerable choice, and they need to think how they wish to config-
ure their activities to meet basic requirements and also to contribute to
competitive objectives. HR managers may have a more active role than is
sometimes thought. By the same token, other actors may be able to influ-
ence them in their choices.
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